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Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
plaintiff petitions the court for an order allowing rehearing of 
the court decision filed by the court on November 10, 1994. 
Plaintiff's counsel hereby certifies that this Petition for 
Rehearing is brought in good faith and not to cause delay. The 
Petition for Rehearing is made because it appears that the court 
overlooked or misunderstood facts in issuing its opinion, 
particularly pertaining to the issue of the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff brought this action as the assignee of the New 
Empire Group consisting of Myron B. Child, Jr., Ronald S. Cook, Ray 
W. Lamoreaux, Wendell P. Hansen, and New Empire Development 
Company. (Opinion, footnote 2) The New Empire Group had a written 
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contract with Alpine, and the rights under that contract had been 
assigned to McKean. Defendant Alpine received $330,000 from 
Richard McKean acting on behalf of New Empire, but neither McKean 
nor Alpine received a conveyance of land required by the contract 
terms. The trial court found that Alpine wrongly refused to 
release the property in question, which determination was not 
challenged on appeal. (Opinion, footnote 8) When the bankruptcy 
court disposed of the land, McKean's contractual right to specific 
performance was abrogated. Therefore, plaintiff, as assignee of 
the New Empire Group, brought this action to recover damages. 
A number of different parties claimed encumbrances 
against the property. One of the New Empire Group members (Child) 
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1982 claiming an interest in the 
subject land, thus preventing conveyance by Alpine of the land to 
the New Empire Group and staying any action by creditors, including 
McKean. On February 28, 1985, defendant Alpine purchased the land 
from the bankruptcy trustee free and clear of liens and 
encumbrances other than the encumbrances senior to Alpine which 
they assumed in their purchase bid. Until disposition of the land 
by the bankruptcy trustee's sale, plaintiff's only remedy under the 
contract was for specific performance to seek recovery of the land. 
The alternative remedy of seeking damages under the equitable 
principle of an implied contract did not accrue or become available 
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to plaintiff until the bankruptcy sale in February 1985. 
The court on page 5 of its opinion finds that the statute 
of limitations on the written contract would have begun to run 
sometime between June 25, 1979, and July 3, 1980. Plaintiff's 
action was brought June 25, 1985, which was within the six year 
period which Utah Code Annotated 78-12-23 allows to bring an action 
"upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing...." 
This court found that if plaintiff had prayed for 
specific performance of the Alpine contract, the 6 year statute of 
limitations would apply. As long as specific performance was an 
appropriate remedy, it was the only remedy afforded under the 
written contract. The New Empire Group or McKean as assignor did 
not have an option to bring an action in equity or for dollar 
damages while the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the 
subject property. The parties stipulated that upon the sale of the 
land on February 28, 1985, by the bankruptcy court the ability to 
seek specific performance terminated. (Opinion, footnote 10) 
Plaintiff had claimed that the action was "founded" on the original 
written contract. This court held that rights under the written 
contract had terminated, and therefore McKean1s cause of action was 
one of implied contract in equity. If it is to be construed that 
the action is one of implied contract, then the four year statute 
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of limitations could only begin to run when the cause of action 
arose on February 28, 1985. Plaintiff believes the court erred in 
not construing the action as one "founded" on the written contract. 
However, even if the action is of implied contract, the statute had 
not expired for the reasons outlined below. 
THE COURT'S RULING AS TO THE TOLLING EFFECT OF 
BANKRUPTCY IS IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED 
The right to bring an action for specific performance was 
stayed by the bankruptcy filed by Myron Child on February 25, 1982, 
because of his claim to an ownership interest in the property. The 
exact nature of that interest never was adjudicated in the 
bankruptcy court because the land was sold for less than the sum 
necessary to pay off priority encumbrances. The automatic stay 
provided under 11 U.S.C. 3 62 prevented any action affecting the 
property. It was not until February 28, 1985, when the bankruptcy 
trustee sold the property to defendant Alpine free L i clear of 
liens that McKean as assignee of the New Empire Group lost his 
contractual right of specific performance. Thereafter he had an 
equitable cause of action seeking damages as his remedy. 
The right of specific performance was stayed from 
February 25, 1982, through at least February 28, 1985, when the 
property was sold. As to any action involving Myron Child, the 
tolling time of an action affecting his interests would continue 
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until his bankruptcy dismissal, but that action does not appeal 
necessary to consider Until at least February 28, 1985, the 
tolling effect of U.C.A. 78-12-41 applied, whnli provides as 
follows: 
When the commencement of an action is stayed 
by injunction or a statutory prohibition the 
time of the continuance of the injunction or 
prohibition is not part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action. 
The court's opinion addresses the tolling effect of the bankruptcy 
as it affects the bankruptcy trustee, Kii+- overlooks the tolling 
effect on the New Empire Group members (and McKean) who were not 
the petitioners in bankruptcy, The bankruptcy code reference 
relied on by the court governs only the bankruptcy stay as it 
applies to I \w truuteu for the debtor and not to other creditors. 
The positions of McKean and New Empire were adverse to the tin istee. 
They were clearly creditors and had no common identity with the 
trustee. Nevertheless, they were prevented for over three years 
from seeking recovery of the real property. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the tolling effect of 
bankruptcy proceedings in the case of Citicorp Mortgage v. Hardy, 
834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992). That case discusses the statute of 
limitations applicable to seeking a deficiency judgment after a 
trust deed foreclosure. The debtor filed a bankruptcy to avoid a 
trust deed foreclosure. The bankruptcy court allowed the trust 
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deed foreclosure to proceed• The debtor's bankruptcy was then 
dismissed without discharge (as was the bankrupt debtor in the case 
at bar). Even though the statute of limitations would have 
normally expired on seeking a deficiency judgment, the court held 
that the bankruptcy tolled the statut and allowed the deficiency 
action to proceed. The court acknowledged that creditors are 
precluded from instituting any action detrimental to the bankruptcy 
estate prior to termination of expiration of the stay. The court 
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the case and stated: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41 bears directly upon 
the issue presented, and its substance is 
wholly consistent with like provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code. In similar plain and 
unequivocal language, the statute provides, 
"When the commencement of an action is stayed 
by injunction or a statutory prohibition the 
time of the continuance or prohibition is not 
part of the time limited for the commenc€iment 
of the action." Thus, under both the 
Bankruptcy Code and our own statute, 
plaintiff's deficiency action was timely 
filed. 
In regard to the public policy considerations 
advanced by plaintiff, the foregoing analysis 
of the applicable statutory provisions has the 
effect of alleviating the potential for 
abusive filings of bankruptcy proceedings to 
defeat legitimate deficiency actions on 
statute of limitations grounds. 
In the case at bar, to allow bankruptcy proceedings to interfere 
with the recovery of land until it is too late to bring an action 
in equity would be manifestly unjust and contrary to the clear 
7 
mandate of the Utah Supreme Court. 
THE COURT APPEARS TO HAVE ERRED IN DETERMINING THE DATE 
FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AN 
EQUITABLE ACTION OF IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Until their rights against the land were extinguished, 
the New Empire Group (McKean) could not have brought an action to 
recover damages. The contract did not provide for a remedy of 
damages. The contract only provided for a remedy of conveyance of 
the property. Therefore, plaintiff had no remedy in equity or for 
damages until the land was sold on February 28, 1985, by the 
bankruptcy court free and clear of liens. 
After the bankruptcy court sold the land, plaintiff's 
remedy changed. Since McKean's cause of action for specific 
performance was lost, his remedy became a remedy for damages or 
equity implied in the written contract. If plaintiff's cause of 
action is not considered to be founded on New Empire's written 
contract, then it was not until plaintiff's encumbrance against the 
land was lost in February 1985 that plaintiff could sue in equity 
to recover damages. 
The court's opinion rests partially on the 1937 case of 
Brown v. Cleverly, 70 P.2d 881 (Utah 1937). The Brown case is 
readily distinguishable because the plaintiff had brought an action 
to nullify a written contract and received a dollar judgment. 
Thereafter the Cleverlys filed bankruptcy and the court discharged 
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the judgment in bankruptcy. The Browns brought a new action 
seeking equitable remedies. The court found that it had been more 
than 4 years after suit was filed on the initial action and 
therefore an action in equity was barred by the staute of 
limitations. 
In the Brown case, the action on the breach of the 
written contract was commenced on May 28, 1931, and tried on the 
merits. No appeal was filed and the judgment became final. On 
August 15, 1935, Browns brought an action seeking an equitable lien 
on real property and provided a means of foreclosing the same. 
This was more than four years after the original action and the 
court did not allow the equitable remedy to be pled on an action 
previously tried on the merits. The court found that it was more 
than four years after the commencement of the initial action before 
the plaintiff first sought to impress a lien upon the real 
property.1 
It is noteworthy that the court considered the statute of 
limitations running from the time of the filing of the May 28, 
1931, action to terminate the contract. The Brown court seems to 
1The initial Brown v. Cleverly action was upon a written 
contract and was fully adjudicated on he merits. The second 
action was an equitable action to imj -ss a lien on property. 
Since the action on the written contract had been fully 
adjudicated, a new action under equity not founded upon a written 
contract had to be filed separately to avoid principles of res 
judicata. 
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hold that the statute of limitations commenced running when the 
rights under the written contract were terminated. 
A significant question before this court that has not 
been addressed is whether McKean's equitable action should arise at 
the time of the breach of the written contract or at the time that 
the right to recover the land under the written contract is lost 
and the equitable action arises. 
Implied assumpsit is a principle of equity normally 
applied when there are no written documents upon which to interpret 
contractual terms. In this case there was no right for the 
equitable relief until plaintiff's right to recover land under the 
written contract was terminated by the trustee's sale of the land. 
It is not logical that a four year statute of limitations could 
expire before the right to sue for specific performance under the 
six year statute of limitations could even occur. 
While the court should not ignore the plain meaning of a 
statute, a statute of limitations should be liberally construed to 
effect the objects of the statute and to promote justice. U.C.A. 
68-3-2 When any doubt exists on the application of the statute of 
limitations, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer 
rather than the shorter period. Hardinae Co. v. Eimco Corp.. 266 
P.2d 494 (Utah 1954); Juab County Department of Public Welfare v. 
Summersf 426 P.2d 1 (Utah 1967). In this case, if there is any 
doubt as to whether the cause of action applies under a six year 
statute of limitations, a tolled four year statute, or a new cause 
of action commencing in 1985, that doubt should be resolved in 
plaintiff's favor. 
In the case of Davidson Lumber Sales v Bonneville 
Investment, Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of the commencement date of the statute of 
limitations under a contract implied in law. This arose out of a 
personal injury case resulting from a defective product. After 
settling the personal injury suit, the seller filed suit against 
the manufacturer to recoup the damages paid to settle the first 
suit. The court held that the action against the manufacturer was 
timely brought even though it was more than four years after the 
injury occurred or the product was purchased. The court held: 
A common-law indemnity action is based on a 
theory of quasi-contract or contract implied 
in law and is generally held to be governed by 
the statute of limitations applicable to 
actions on implied contracts. A common-law 
indemnity action is, therefore, wholly 
distinct from the underlying action which gave 
rise to the right of indemnity. One 
commentator has stated: 
"An action on an implied contract of 
indemnity is wholly irdependent as a cause of 
action from the transa. „ion or situation which 
gave rise to the right of indemnity. Although 
the right to indemnity may arise out of a 
tort, the action to enforce the right usually 
is not governed by the statute relating to the 
tort. Similarly, a right of indemnity which 
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arises out of an express contract to pay money 
or perform some other act generally is not 
governed by the statute of limitations 
applicable to an action upon an express 
contract, where such statute is distinct from 
the statute governing actions upon implied 
contracts." 
Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Covers 
Action for Indemnity, 57 A.L.R.3d 833, § 3 
(1974) . 
* * * 
A common-law indemnity action does not arise 
when the underlying damage occurs; rather, it 
runs from the time of the payment of the 
underlying claim or the payment of a judgment 
or a settlement. See Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 
1984) ; Annotation, When Statute of Limitations 
Commences to Run Against Claim for a 
Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort. 57 
A.L.R.3d 867, § 3[a] (1974). 
The cause of action under implied contract in the 
Davidson case did not arise until all of the economics of the cause 
of action came into being. Likewise, the cause of action in the 
case at bar did not arise until the right to recover the real 
property was lost by the trustee's sale on February 28, 1985, and 
the plaintiff thereafter had an equitable action to recover an 
implied remedy. 
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214 
(Utah 1984) the court held that in an action arising under an 
implied contract, "the statute of limitations on an indemnity 
action does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues, 
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even though the statute of limitations on the underlying action may 
already have run." See also Salt Lake City Corp, v. Kasler Corp.f 
842 F.Supp. 1380 (D.Utah 1994) 
In the case at bar, the statute of limitations of the 
separate cause of action for damages under an implied contract 
could not have arisen until February 28, 1985, when the real 
property was sold and the rights of specific performance were 
terminated. 
SHOULD THE CASE HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS MOOT 
As a secondary issue, the court held that the defendants1 
appeal was not "moot" (Opinion, footnote 6). The court relied in 
part on the case of West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. . 818 P.2d 
1311, 1316 (Utah App. 1991). That case held that when a party 
satisfies a judgment at a lower level it does not make the issue 
moot or waive the right of appeal "when the right of appeal has 
been specifically reserved by stipulation between adverse parties." 
The West Valley City case needs to be distinguished from the case 
at bar. It only involved a partial satisfaction of judgment and 
the stipulation was between the adverse parties. 
In that case the adversarial parties stipulated that 
neither party waived any right of appeal. In the case at bar, a 
total satisfaction of judgment was filed by parties who were 
business partners of the defendants who had acquired an interest in 
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the judgment through an execution sale. The defendants entered 
into the stipulation which allowed a continuation of an appeal. 
However, neither McKean nor his attorney were parties to that 
stipulation. The parties to the stipulation were working together 
for their mutual benefit to avoid payment of attorney's fees. 
McKean's attorney had a vital interest in the protection of his 
attorney's lien and was not informed of the stipulation or made a 
party to it. In effect, the defendants were the buyers of their 
own judgment and continued the appeal solely to avoid paying the 
attorney's lien. 
The case at bar is more closely related to Jacobsen, 
Morrin & Robbins Construction Company v. St. Joseph High School. 
794 P.2d 505 (Utah App. 1990) . Also significant is the very recent 
Utah Supreme ruling on September 14, 1994, John H. Klas v. Van 
Wagoner, Sup. Ct. Case No. 930504 (unpublished but attached). The 
court dismissed an appeal as moot because a total satisfaction of 
judgment had been entered by the lower court even though the lower 
court had authorized the appellant to pay the judgment and continue 
the appeal. It would be appropriate for the court to review its 
decision as to the mootness of the appeal. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiff requests the court for a rehearing for the 
following reasons: 
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1. The court appears to have misunderstood the facts as 
they relate to the tolling effect of the bankruptcy preventing 
McKean or the New Empire Group from pursuing their remedy of 
specific performance. Plaintiff requests the court to reconsider 
its opinion as to the tolling effect against the New Empire Group 
(McKean) pursuing its action against Alpine. 
2. The Court's decision appears to be in error as to the 
effective date in which the statute of limitations commences on a 
claim under "implied assumpsit" or implied contract. 
3. The court appears to have been in error in addressing 
what constitutes a cause of action "founded" upon a written 
contract. 
4. The court's appears to have not fully understood the 
facts regarding the filing of a full satisfaction of judgment and 
is requested to reconsider the question of whether the appeal was 
moot. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the court allow a 
rehearing of this matter for the reasons stated. 
DATED this ~2si~- day of November 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH R. TATE, JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff ^ 
23JT THB SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OP UTAH 
John H- K l a s , 
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l e e , 
v . No. 930504 
Mar3c O* Van Wagoner and 880903192 
Ka th ryn Van Wagoner, 
Defendan t s and A p p e l l a n t s . 
ORDER 
This case is moot and is therefore dismissed. 
%A^— J2 
FOR THE CODRT 
S7 
*Z-
>Mffehaa£''D. Zistmerman 
Chief J u s t i c e 
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